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APPENDIX FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
Additional Figures
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Figure A1. Distribution of monthly declared VAT for the full study sample, twelve months
prior to treatment to twelve months after treatment, excluding the top and bottom 5%.
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Figure A2. Impact of Deterrence Letter: Second Wave of Mailing
Notes: This figure plots the monthly percent difference between the medians of the treatment and
the control group of the deterrence letter for the second wave of mailing: (median VAT treatment
group - median VAT control group) / (median VAT control group), normalizing the average of pre-
treatment months percent difference to zero. The y-axis indicates time, with monthly observations,
and zero indicates the last month before the mailing of the letters. The vertical line marks mailing
of the letters. Since the second wave of mailing is much smaller than the first, the figure shows a
more noisy pattern than the first wave displayed in Figure 2, Panel A.
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Deter vs. Control: Prob. (Input Costs > Previous Year)
Panel A: Sales Panel B: Input Costs
Mailing of Letters
−4
0
4
Pe
rc
en
t D
iff
er
en
ce
 
−10 −5 0 5 10
 
Month
Deter vs. Control: Prob. (Final Sales > Previous Year)
Mailing of Letters
−4
0
4
Pe
rc
en
t D
iff
er
en
ce
 
−10 −5 0 5 10
 
Month
Deter vs. Control: Prob. (Intermediary Sales > Prev. Year)
Panel C: Final Sales Panel D: Intermediary Sales
Figure A3. Impact of Deterrence Letter on Different Types of Transactions
Notes: This figure plots the percent difference between deterrence letter and control group of the
probability that a line item (total sales, total input costs, intermediary sales or final sales) is larger
than in the same month of the previous year, normalizing the average of pre-treatment months
percent difference to zero. The y-axis indicates time, with monthly observations, and zero indicates
the last month before the mailing of the letters. Figures show the first wave of mailing.
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Figure A4. Impact by Firm Size (Median Regression)
Notes: Each bar represents a separate median regression for each size category. The numbers on
top of the bars indicate the coefficient on being in the deterrence letter treatment group of a median
regression of mean monthly VAT payments in the four months following treatment. The height of
the bar indicates the effect in percent relative to the mean in the control group in that size category.
*** = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1
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Figure A5. Spillover Effects on Trading Partners’ VAT Payments, Quarterly
Notes: This figure plots the percent difference between the group receiving a pre-announcement
and the control group of the probability that declared VAT is larger than in the same month of
the previous year (Panels A and C) and the probability that declared VAT is larger than predicted
(Panels B and D), normalizing the average of pre-treatment months percent difference to zero. The y-
axis indicates time, with observations aggregated at the quarterly level because monthly observations
are very noisy, and zero indicates the last quarter before the mailing of the letters.
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Additional Tables
Table A1—Deterrence Letter Experiment: Monthly Effects on VAT Payments
(1) (2) (3)
Percent VAT > Previous
Year
Percent VAT >
Predicted
Percent VAT >
Zero
Deterrence ×t− 5 -0.02 -0.12 -0.07
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence ×t− 4 0.26 0.03 0.02
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence ×t− 3 0.10 -0.29* -0.03
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence ×t− 2 0.05 -0.30* -0.14
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence ×t− 1 0.19 -0.07 -0.09
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence ×t+ 1 1.07*** 1.17*** 0.48***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence ×t+ 2 1.76*** 1.73*** 0.56***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence ×t+ 3 1.46*** 1.30*** 0.48***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence ×t+ 4 1.64*** 1.21*** 0.46***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence ×t+ 5 0.99*** 0.83*** -0.15
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence ×t+ 6 0.94*** 0.72*** 0.12
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence ×t+ 7 0.88*** 0.59*** 0.04
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Deterrence ×t+ 8 0.92*** 0.63*** 0.17
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Deterrence ×t+ 9 0.85*** 0.75*** 0.31
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Deterrence
×t+ 10
0.87*** 0.68*** 0.10
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Deterrence
×t+ 11
0.73*** 0.82*** 0.16
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Deterrence
×t+ 12
0.77*** 0.04*** 0.12
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
Constant 45.00*** 48.28*** 63,73***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Month fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 6,859,747 6,859,747 6,859,747
Number of firms 408,636 408,636 408,636
R2 0.004 0.000 0.005
Notes: Each column shows a linear probability regression on interaction terms of being assigned to
receive a deterrence letter with month dummies. Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by
100 to express effects in percent. Sample includes all firms in the deterrence treatment and the control
group. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table A2—Robustness Checks of Intent-to-Treat Effects on VAT Payments
Letter Message Experiment Spillover Experiment
Percent VAT > Percent VAT >
Median VAT Previous Year Previous Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Deterrence letter × post 1,258*** 1.96***
(287) (0.27)
Tax morale letter × post 36 0.49
(522) (0.57)
Placebo letter × post 476 -0.52
(603) (0.56)
Audit announcement × 3.99
Post (2.75)
Audit announcement × 7.17**
supplier × post (3.54)
Audit announcement × 0.78
client × post (3.92)
Number of observations 782,446 644,024 643,908 782,446 644,024 643,908 5,658 3,196 3,196
Number of firms 391,223 322,012 321,954 391,223 322,012 321,954 2,829 1,598 1,598
Notes: Non-linear estimation strategies based on Athey and Imbens (2006) (Columns (1)-(3)) and
Blundell and Dias (2009)(Columns (4)-(9)). Columns (1)-(6) show robustness checks for Table 4,
Columns (7)-(9) for Table 7. Observations affected by the other treatments are excluded, since
all treatment groups are non-overlapping. Standard errors bootstrapped using 1,000 replications.
Coefficients and standard errors of the Blundell Costa-Dias regressions are multiplied by 100 to express
effects in percent. Monetary amounts are in Chilean pesos, with 500 Chilean pesos approximately
equivalent to 1 USD. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A3—Effects Including Carry-Overs
Letter Experiment Spillover Experiment: Trading Partners
(1) (2) (3)
Percent VAT > Percent VAT > Percent VAT >
Previous Year Previous Year Previous Year
Deterrence letter × post 1.35***
(0.137)
Tax morale letter × post 0.237
(0.296)
Placebo letter × post -0.413
(0.297)
Audit announcement ×
supplier × post 3.49* 3.29*
(1.8) (1.79)
Audit announcement ×
client × post -2.01 -2.10
(2.08) (2.12)
Supplier × post -1.17 -1.38
(2.03) (2.12)
Constant 46.71*** 49.63*** 50.40***
(0.075) (0.93) (0.94)
Controls × post No No Yes
Controls × audit
announcement × post No No Yes
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 7,892,076 45,264 44,288
Number of firms 445,734 2,829 2,768
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.13 0.13
Notes: Regressions of the probability that monthly declared VAT including carry-overs
from previous declarations is higher than in the same month of the previous year. Column
(1) corresponds to Column (3) of Table 4. Columns (2) and (3) correspond to Columns (3)
and (5) of Table 7. The controls in Column (3) are firm sales, sales/input-ratio, share of
sales going to final consumers, and industry categorized as “hard-to-monitor.” Coefficients
and standard errors are multiplied by 100 to express effects in percent. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A4—Intent-to-Treat Effects For Cost-Benefit Calculations (for Micro-Size Firms)
Four Months Post-Treatment Twelve Months Post-Treatment
(1) (2)
Deterrence × post 2,523** 1,360
(1,086) (931)
Tax morale × post 3,231 1,259
(1,997) (1,657)
Placebo × post -2,934 -1,649
(1,996) (1,795)
Constant 58,872 58,841
(621) (642)
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16
Winsorized at 5th and 95th Percentile
Deterrence × post 1,550*** 1,093***
(182) (175)
Tax morale × post 585 783
(392) (367)
Placebo × post 379 463
(401) (369)
Constant 48,163 48,134
(120) (125)
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.47
Month fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 5,879,337 6,916,536
Number of firms 332,048 314,388
Notes: Regressions of mean declared VAT on treatment dummies among micro-size firms. Observations are
monthly for ten months prior to treatment and four months or twelve months after treatment, respectively.
Column (2) excludes firms in the second wave of mailing because there are not 12 post-treatment months available
for these firms. The first set of estimates are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.1% to deal with extreme outliers,
as is in Table 4. Monetary amounts are in Chilean pesos, with 500 Chilean pesos approximately equivalent to 1
USD. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A5—Cost-Benefit Calculations for Micro-Size Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Winsorization Number of Monthly effect Overall effect Overall effect Number of Total additional Additional tax Marginal
months (Pesos) (Pesos) (USD) firms tax revenue revenue net of return rate
(USD) mailing cost (USD) (USD)
0.1 Percent 4 2,523 10,092 19 75,994 1,452,522 1,376,528 18-fold
5 Percent 4 1,550 6,200 12 75,994 893,505 816,360 11-fold
5 Percent 12 1,093 13,116 25 63,041 1,565,996 1,502,955 24-fold
Notes: 102,031 firms received a deterrence letter. Out of these, 75,994 are micro-size (i.e. firms with up to
100,000 USD in annual sales.) When calculating the additional tax revenue for twelve post-treatment months,
firms from the second wave of mailing are excluded because there are not 12 post-treatment months available
for these firms. The cost of sending a letter through certified mail was 528 pesos or approximately 1 USD.
Additional Cost Considerations
In addition to the marginal cost of mailing for each letter, the tax authority also incurred a fixed cost of setting
up the intervention. Namely, there was a time cost of the tax authority staff in the development of the specific
wording of the letter, informing their representatives on how to respond to inquiries to the letter, etc.
Finally, and importantly, as noted in footnote 17 of the paper and in Pomeranz, Marshall and Castellon (2014),
sending out deterrence letters that are not backed up by a strong increase in the audit probability can lead to
a reputational cost for the tax authority and can undermine its deterrence power. To make this a sustainable
policy, the tax authority has to increase the probability of audits, with corresponding costs. To calculate the
full cost of the intervention, one would therefore need to include the reputation cost or alternatively the cost of
additional audits. However, the strong response to the second wave of this experiment, 5 months after the first
wave, suggests that the deterrence letters did not lead to an immediate loss in deterrence power.
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Table A6—Impact of Deterrence Letter on Different Types of Transactions, Sample Includ-
ing Pure Retailers and Intermediary Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Percent Sales > Percent Input Costs > Percent Intermediary Percent Final Sales >
Previous Year Previous Year Sales > Previous Year Previous Year
Deterrence × post 1.01*** -0.02 0.22** 0.90***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant 50.07*** 48.94*** 29.40*** 29.03***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 7,340,994 7,340,994 7,340,994 7,340,994
Number of firms 408,636 408,636 408,636 408,636
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.25 0.38 0.47
Notes: Regressions of the probability of the line item (total sales, total input costs, intermediary sales, and final
sales) being higher than in the same month the previous year, among the full sample including pure retailers and
intermediary firms. Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 to express effects in percent. Sample
includes all firms in the deterrence treatment and the control group. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A7—Differential Impact of Deterrence Letter within Firms by Type of Transaction
Percent Line-Item > Previous Year
(1) (2)
Comparing Sales Comparing Final
vs. Input Costs vs. Intermediary Sales
Deterrence letter × post × sales dummy 1.26***
(0.17)
Deterrence letter × post × final sales dummy 1.23***
(0.23)
Sales dummy 1.98***
(0.51)
Final sales dummy 5.64***
(0.12)
Sales dummy × post Yes
Final sales dummy × post Yes
Firm fixed effects × post Yes Yes
Month fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Number of observations 4,785,058 4,785,058
Number of firms 133,156 133,156
R2 0.32 0.24
Notes: Regression of the probability of the line item being higher than in the same month of the previous year.
Each observation is one of two line items for a given firm in a given month: Sales and input costs in Column
(1), final and intermediate sales in Column (2). Column (1) compares the impact on sales with the impact on
input costs within a given firm. Column (2) does the same for final sales vs. intermediate sales. The reg2hdfe
routine (Guimaraes and Portugal, 2010), used to produce the large number two-level fixed effects (firm fixed
effects and firm fixed effects × post), does not produce a constant term. The four months after the second wave
exclude firms treated in the first. Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100 to express effects in
percent. Sample contains all firms that have both final and intermediary sales in the period prior to treatment.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
